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Abstract
The importance of the door for human civilization cannot be overstated. In various cultures, 
the door has been a central technology for negotiating the distinction between inside and 
outside, private and public, and profane and sacred. By tracing the material and symbolic 
significance of the door in American Fourth Amendment case law, this article illuminates 
the vitality of matter for law’s everyday practices. In particular, it highlights how various 
door configurations affect the level of constitutional protections granted to those situated 
on the inside of the door and the important role of vision for establishing legal expectations 
of privacy. Eventually, I suggest that we might be witnessing the twilight of the “physical 
door” era and the beginning of a “virtual door” era in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
As recent physical and technological changes present increasingly sophisticated challenges to 
the distinctions between inside and outside, private and public, and prohibited and accepted 
visions, the Supreme Court will need to carefully articulate what is worth protecting on the 
other side of the door.
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The gate to the law stands open, as always.
—Franz Kafka, “Before the Law”1
I. Introduction
The importance of the door for human civilization cannot be overstated. Across various times 
and cultures, the door has been a central technology for facilitating the distinction between 
inside and outside, individuals and society, private and public, and profane and sacred. 
According to some, the door was the medium that initially turned the hunter into a shepherd, 
thereby distinguishing man from animal.2 In his essay “Where are the Missing Masses,”3 
Bruno Latour traces the genealogy of door design. In his words: “Walls are a nice invention, 
but if there were no holes in them there would be no way to get in or out – they would be 
mausoleums or tombs … So architects invented this hybrid: a wall hole, often called a door, 
which although common enough has always struck me as a miracle of technology.”4
The “thingness” of the door is intimately tied to that of the threshold: the liminal space 
that “belongs neither to the inside nor the outside and is thus an extremely dangerous 
space.”5 According to anthropologist Arnold van Gennep: “To cross the threshold is to 
unite oneself with a new world. It is thus an important act in marriage, adoption, ordination, 
and funeral ceremonies.”6 Drawing on van Gennep, Victor Turner coined the term liminal-
ity, which refers to the marginal (or “limen”) stage of transition whereby the subject of the 
passage ritual is invisible. In Turner’s words, “As members of society, most of us see only 
what we expect to see, and what we expect to see is what we are conditioned to see when 
we have learned the definitions and classifications of our culture.”7 Along similar lines, 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu says about the door of the traditional Berber house that:
During the summer the door of the house must remain open all day long so that the fertilizing 
light of the sun may enter, and with it prosperity. A closed door means penury and sterility: 
to sit down upon the threshold means, by obstructing it, to close the passage to happiness and 
plenitude. When one wishes prosperity to someone one says: “May your door remain open.”8
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  9. Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses?,” p. 159.
 10. Siegert, “Doors: On the Materiality of the Symbolic,” 9.
 11. Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses?,” pp. 152–3.
Although in contemporary western cultures doors have seemingly been relieved of such 
rituals of passage and reduced to their straightforward materiality, the symbolic and even 
spiritual meanings assigned to the liminal space between “in” and “out” are still acutely 
relevant. The space of the door is, quite literally, a liminal space. Looking at how 
American courts have construed this space may thus help us understand how they con-
ceive liminality more broadly. Furthermore, studying the legal geography of doors may 
contribute to a deeper understanding of other legal thresholds.
Despite its benign appearance, the door is never a neutral technology. Latour points 
out the various ways in which doors discriminate. The heavy hydraulic door, for exam-
ple, discriminates against the very little and very old, as well as “against furniture remov-
ers and in general everyone with packages, which usually means, in our late capitalist 
society, working- or lower-middle-class employees.”9 Hence, doors are not only an 
architectural medium; they are also “operators of symbolic, epistemic, and social pro-
cesses that, with help from the difference between inside and outside, generate spheres 
of law, secrecy, and privacy and thereby articulate space in such a way that it becomes a 
carrier of cultural codes.”10
Drawing on the insights of Science and Technology Studies (STS), this article will 
explore how the door matters in American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. I will begin 
with a brief account of the importance of the home – into which the door provides both 
visual access (similar to a window) and an opportunity for bodily entry – in American 
criminal procedure. Next, I will discuss the spatiolegal rituals performed by the police, 
and the case law established by American courts, with regard to the door. In particular, I 
will focus on police searches and seizures that illuminate the door’s liminal legal geog-
raphy. Finally, I will highlight law’s focus on vision, mainly in the context of the home 
but also with respect to cars.
In light of recent technological advancements that enhance the ability to literally see 
through walls, we might be witnessing the end of the physical door era and the beginning 
of a virtual door era. Currently, the courts seem to be operating as if the door still blocks 
view, but this may change as the technology presents increasingly sophisticated challenges 
to the distinctions between in and out, private and public, and legal and illegal visions. This 
is therefore an important moment for reflecting on what U.S. courts and American society 
at large believe is worthy of protection on the inside of the residential door.
Throughout the article I revisit Latour’s realization that, “To balance our accounts of 
society, we simply have to turn our exclusive attention from humans and look also at 
nonhumans.”11 My analysis here will show that the door’s meanings and materialities 
are, in fact, inseparable. The door, in other words, is both a symbol of sacred domesticity 
and a technology that possesses material agency. The door also provides an allegorical 
entry into a bizarre constitutional discourse whereby doors both embody and represent 
the relationship between the Government, on one side of the door, and the People, on the 
door’s other side.
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445 U.S. 573 (1980), p. 598; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), p. 94; Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), p. 931.
 17. Pesciotta, “I’m Not Dead Yet,” n. 182 (citing Code of Hammurabi art. 21 (Robert Francis 
Harper ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1904) (ca. 1750 B.C.E.)).
 18. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of Public Wrongs, Vol. 4253 
(Beacon Press 1962).
 19. Amelia L. Diedrich, “Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of 
the Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment,” Hastings Const. L.Q. 39 (2011), 299.
 20. B. D. Benjamin Barros, “Home as a Legal Concept,” Santa Clara L. Rev. 46 (2006), 257, 271.
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II. The Home as One’s Castle
Law makes and unmakes the home.
—Jeannie Suk, “Taking the Home”12
The home is conventionally described in legal discourse as a refuge or sanctuary, a for-
tress or castle, and a haven in a heartless world.13 Even the “poorest man[’s] ruined tene-
ment”14 is afforded the same protections, including the ability to exclude the king from 
entering with impunity.15 A man’s home is his “castle and fortress.”16 The sanctity of the 
home is not a unique invention of American, or even English, law: it has been the nexus 
of certain protections as far back as the Code of Hammurabi17 and descends from “the 
sentiments of ancient Rome.”18 The direct antecedent to the American protections of the 
home are the protections afforded to eighteenth-century British landowners. Indeed, 
“The British state … existed to preserve the property and, incidentally, the lives and 
liberties, of the propertied.”19
The home assumes a unique significance in modern liberal societies, where it pro-
vides a nest for individuality, family, privacy, security, and liberty.20 In the words of 
David Delaney: “In our world, it’s fair to say, the modern home is more specifically 
registered as the liberal home . . . Hence the interpretive and affective salience of the 
public/private distinction; hence the valorization of privacy, security, protection, and 
self-expression; hence the expression of these in the idioms of rights.”21 The physical 
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see also Barros, “Home as a Legal Concept,” 265–6 (describing homes as given extra atten-
tion compared to other types of property in revolutionary rhetoric and early federal legisla-
tion; citing Thomas Y. Davies, “Rediscovering the Original Fourth Amendment,” Mich. L. 
Rev. 98 (1999), 642, n.259).
 25. Barros, “Home as a Legal Concept,” 265–6 (search and seizure, tax law, bankruptcy, family 
law, “other examples abound”); Pesciotta, “I’m Not Dead Yet,” 219–20 (zoning law, tort 
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(2010), 1083 (housing law, civil rights); but see Barros, supra, at 295–300 (describing the 
lack of discussion of the home in eminent domain analysis in Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
 26. Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses?,” p. 158 (“No matter what you feel, think, or do, 
you have to leave a bit of your energy, literally, at the door. This is as clever as a toll booth”).
 27. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 
49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (“the sanctity of private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most 
stringent Fourth Amendment protection”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 
96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (“less rigorous warrant requirements govern 
manifestation of the home as “the house” in particular occupies a central place in 
American legal traditions. Houses are mentioned explicitly in both the Third and Fourth 
Amendments22 and implicitly in the First Amendment,23 indicating a clear concern for 
this space by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.24 The protections and importance of 
the house/home are recognized, additionally, in many other areas of the law.25
My central concern in this article is the hybrid legal geography of wall and hole 
(“door”) that serves as the “obligatory passage point”26 to the home and how this hybrid 
spatiolegal entity is interpreted in the context of Fourth Amendment protections. The 
Fourth Amendment establishes:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.27
The federal courts have been acutely sensitive to one’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the home.28 Until the monumental 1967 Supreme Court decision of Katz that 
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[automobile searches] because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile 
is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office” (footnote omitted)); United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), p. 313 (“physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . .”); Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), p. 301 (the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect “the 
sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life”), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] 
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion”); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1194, 
2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (government entry into house “invades the precious interest of pri-
vacy”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 192, 93 L.Ed. 
153 (1948) (the Fourth Amendment “marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values 
of our civilization . . . [T]he Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the 
police before they violate the privacies of the home”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed.2d 436 (1948) (“The right of officers to thrust themselves into 
a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to 
dwell in reasonable security”); Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C.313, 317, 435 
F.2d 385, 389 (1970) (“Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype 
of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment”); Commonwealth v. Forde, 
329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Mass. 1975) (“The right of police officers to enter into a home, for 
whatever purpose, represents a serious governmental intrusion into one’s privacy. It was just 
this sort of intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed to circumscribe by the gen-
eral requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause”); Sir Edward Coke, Third 
Institute of the Laws of England 162 (1644) (“a man’s house is his castle”).
 29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
 30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
 31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), pp. 474–5 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
 32. Pesciotta, “I’m Not Dead Yet,” 196, citing Russell L. Weaver, “The Fourth Amendment, 
Privacy and Advancing Technology,” Miss. L.J. 80 (2011), 1150.
incorporated the concept of privacy into the juridical analysis,29 the Court’s interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment was concerned primarily with its tangible geographies, which 
it based on a finite list in the Constitution. The main threat to the house was, in other 
words, its physical invasion30 and the protected right was the “indefeasible right . . . of 
private property.”31 Subsequent developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence main-
tain the same underlying logic of protecting the home from invasion.32 Yet whereas some 
cases are concerned with physical bodily invasion by the state into the intimacies of the 
home – namely, with the function of the door as a technology that enables and disables a 
full bodily entry – other cases focus on the permissibility of governmental gazes into the 
home through the door – namely the door’s function as a window. Finally, the invention 
of technologies that enable seeing through walls without the use of doors (in their function 
as either door or window) has resulted in the configuration of doors in recent cases as 
symbolic matters, as indicators of an illegal invasion into the privacy of one’s home.
Despite the recent challenges to the physical invasion approach of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has clarified that the trespass test still applies in this 
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 35. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), p. 589.
 36. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct., 945 (2012), p. 949 (referring to Entick v. Carrington, 95 
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 817 (1765); citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 
S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989); quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626, 6 
S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886)).
 37. Adam Benforado, “The Geography of Criminal Law,” Cardozo L. Rev. 31 (2010), 882–4 
(discussing United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 
(1969) (obscenity); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sodomy)). Notably, these 
crimes involve other issues, including First Amendment and privacy protections.
 38. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 555–6 (1895).
 39. Benforado, “The Geography of Criminal Law,” 883–4.
 40. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 36 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (“When one intrudes into the 
dwelling of another, the harm is the violation of the sanctity of the dwelling itself, not 
merely to a particular person’s property interest”).
 41. Benforado, “The Geography of Criminal Law,” n.294 (citing Weiand v. State, 732 So.2d 
1044 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884)), United States v. Peterson, 
483 F.2d 1222, (D.C. Cir. 1973), People v. Eatman, 91 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1950)).
 42. Mark Cordes, “Property and the First Amendment,” U. Rich. L. Rev. 31 (1997), 42–9 (dis-
cussing the home in relation to various First Amendment rights).
context.33 “At the Amendment’s very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,” the Supreme 
Court Justices re-emphasized in their 2013 decision Florida v. Jardines.34 In another 
decision, the Justices clarified their position that: “The Fourth Amendment protects the 
individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly 
defined that when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s 
home.”35 In spite of the technological developments, then these and other cases charac-
terize the protection of the home as a longstanding tradition and as a “monument of 
English freedom.”36 Perhaps the most far-reaching protection in this regard is the gov-
ernment’s lack of power to prosecute certain crimes when they occur exclusively within 
the home, including obscenity and sodomy.37
The various constitutional protections against invasion are not limited to govern-
mental actions. In addition to the property right to exclude others, the Supreme Court 
has stated that there is no duty to retreat from attack “on [one’s] premises,”38 and many 
states39 have laws that afford defenses to citizens who use otherwise unacceptable force 
to defend the “sanctity of their homes.”40 This, again, is based on the assumption that a 
“man’s home is his castle” and that its dweller has a right to defend it against intru-
sion.41 A similar logic is applied to protect a “man in his castle” from the exercise of 
First Amendment rights by others.42 It is important to note in this context that feminist 
critiques of homes as virtual traps for victims of intimate violence have led to government 
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 43. Delaney, “Home as Nomic Setting: Seeing How the Legal Happens,” 64: “The develop-
ment of Civil Protection Orders has empowered some abused women to expel and exclude 
from their homes those who torment them, or to avail themselves of the threat of arrest in 
order to augment bargaining power in their homes.” See also Beverly Balos, “The Legal 
Response to Domestic Violence: Problems and Possibilities: A Man’s Home is his Castle: 
How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment,” St. Louis U. Pub. L. 
Rev. 23 (2004), 77–105; Catherine Carpenter, “Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, 
and Self Defense,” Marq. L. Rev. 86 (2003), 653–700; Riva Siegal, “‘The Rule of Love’: 
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,” Yale L. J. 105 (1996), 2117–208.
 44. Civil protection orders have recently been replaced by criminal protection orders. Some fem-
inist legal scholars and advocates see this re-signification as having effectively empowered 
prosecutors at the expense of women insofar as women no longer control the terms of arrests 
and prosecutions (see Delaney, “Home as Nomic Setting”). In the words of Jeannie Suk:
If the rhetoric of privacy has worked in our history to justify nonintervention in the home, 
the new regime relies on a rhetoric of publicness to envision the home as in need of pub-
lic control, like the streets. The home, the archetype of private space, becomes a site of 
intense public investment . . . [I]n this regime, the home is a space in which criminal law 
deliberately and coercively reorders and controls . . . relationships . . . not as an incident of 
prosecution, but as its goal.
Jeannie Suk, “Criminal Law Comes Home,” Yale L. J., 116 (2006), 2–71.
 45. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
entry into the home in the form of protection orders43 and, more recently, to feminist 
critiques of such orders.44
III. Delineating the Fourth Amendment Threshold
The critical importance of the home in American jurisprudence manifests in the designation 
of heightened protections to privacy, property, and liberty when those are exercised within 
the home. In the Fourth Amendment context, such enhanced protections against govern-
mental (mostly police) intrusions have translated into the requirement that absent limited 
and pre-defined emergency situations (“exigency”), the police must obtain a warrant to 
legally enter a home. The warrant is a judicially reviewed authorization granted to govern-
mental officials to search or seize; it must be supported by an affidavit from the relevant 
governmental official that outlines the specific facts and scope of the search and that estab-
lishes probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed. 
Generally, a police invasion of the home without obtaining a valid warrant based on proba-
ble cause will render the seized evidence inadmissible in court. At least on the face of things, 
then, administrative obstacles inherently linked to the geography of police practices impose 
heightened scrutiny on such practices when they occur within the home. Demarcating where 
the outside ends and where the home begins is thus crucial for ascertaining the legal rights 
applicable in each case. The stakes of this demarcation are incredibly high: they determine 
the course of human lives, impelling them toward either freedom or incarceration.
The Supreme Court has long declared its intentions to come up with “bright line 
rules” in criminal procedure cases. In Payton v. New York (1980),45 the Supreme Court 
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 48. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), p. 181 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
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 52. Brendan Peters, “Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule,” Stan. L. 
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Work, Life, and Refuge in the Information Age (Notre Dame, IN: Sorin Books, 2002), p. 39 
and quoting Terence Riley, Chief Curator of the Museum of Modern Art’s Department of 
Architecture and Design, discussing Museum’s exhibition The Un-Private House (1999).
situated the bright line at the door to the house. The Court also acknowledged that this 
line could be thin or thick, depending on the circumstances. To accommodate this vari-
ability, the Court adopted the common law doctrine of the curtilage, which expands the 
house’s protections to the area immediately surrounding it. The Court, in other words, 
effectively expanded the house’s protections to the “intimate activity associated with the 
‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”46
United States v. Dunn (1987) provided additional guidance on how to determine the 
existence and boundaries of the curtilage. The Court instructed that: “curtilage questions 
should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed 
to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the 
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to 
protect the area from observation by people passing by.”47 Through the curtilage doctrine, 
the door’s physical liminality and its function as an obligatory passage point has expanded 
to become one of an obligatory passage zone between outside (i.e., public, less protected) 
and inside (i.e., private, more protected) spaces. In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, then, 
the threshold is not limited to its quintessential form – the door – but includes proximate 
spaces that have acquired the door’s liminal quality. Although not situated inside the house, 
these spaces still receive similarly heightened legal protections.
Alongside its acknowledgement that the bright line is not really a line but rather a 
zone that encompasses the curtilage, the Supreme Court also warned against case-by-
case solutions that depend on “all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts” and that require “the draw-
ing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions.”48 Accordingly, in Oliver v. United 
States,49 the Court declared that “for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be 
clearly marked”50 and that the curtilage concept is “a familiar one easily understood from 
our daily experience.”51
Despite the Court’s aspiration for clear demarcations, however, in many cases the line 
between the private home and public space has turned out to be “blurred and fluid.”52 
The Seventh Circuit observed, for example, that: “The lines are not so clear, however, 
because exactly where outside ends and where the home begins is not a point 
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 53. Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2001).
 54. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, p. 574.
 55. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, p. 590.
 56. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
 57. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), p. 40.
 58. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), p. 40 n.1.
 59. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
 60. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), p. 42 (citation omitted).
 61. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), p. 42.
 62. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (“What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection”) (emphasis added).
 63. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 265 U.S. 59 (1924).
immediately obvious.”53 To complicate matters further, in Payton and Santana the 
Supreme Court has provided inconsistent guidance regarding the pragmatic applications 
of its door-centered jurisprudence.
Payton is a consolidation of two cases, both dealing with a New York statute that 
allows a warrantless entry into a home to make a felony arrest.54 In this decision, the 
Supreme Court struck down this New York statute, stating: “In terms that apply equally 
to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a 
firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may 
not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”55
Four years before its protective Payton decision, the Supreme Court issued United 
States v. Santana.56 In that case, the officers drove to Santana’s residence armed with 
probable cause, but lacking a warrant. Upon arrival, they saw Santana “standing in the 
doorway of the house.”57 One of the officers testified that “one step forward would have 
put her outside, one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence.”58 
The officers got out, shouted “police,” displayed their identification and approached 
Santana, who retreated into the house. The officers pursued, catching her in the vestibule. 
The Court upheld the arrest and subsequent search.59 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, explained that:
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of one’s dwelling is 
“private,” as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that under the cases 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a “public” place. She was not in an area 
where she had any expectation of privacy. “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”60
Although it observed that when standing at her door Santana was within the private prop-
erty of her home, the Court nonetheless decided that she did not have an expectation of 
privacy because she willingly exposed herself to public view. This lack of expectation 
then attached to Santana as she fled into the confines of her home.61 The Court relied on 
Katz v. United States62 and cited Hester v. United States63 for the proposition that because 
Santana “was not merely visible to the public, but was as exposed to public view, speech, 
hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house,” she was 
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 65. United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987).
 66. United States v. Peters, 912 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1990) but see Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 
1100, at 1103 (8th Cir. 1989):
Duncan, however, asserts that he had simply opened the door and remained in the home. * 
* * Duncan stepped farther back into the house and attempted to close the door. It was at 
that time that Duncan claims he was pulled from his home by the officers. * * * Under this 
version it would be impossible to hold as a matter of law that he voluntarily placed himself 
in a public place and willingly relinquished the expectation of privacy that he is entitled to 
when he is within his home.
 67. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995).
 68. McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996).
 69. United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2000).
 70. United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2000), pp. 53–4.
able to be pursued into the house to be arrested and searched.64 The importance of vision 
(in this quote with a nod toward other sensorial properties) as the prime means for deter-
mining privacy rights cannot be overstated, raising the question: what will happen when 
physical matters such as doors no longer impede state vision? Until this happens, how-
ever, the door, with its substantive thingness and its symbolic powers, is the center of a 
ritualistic legal dance: one step forward, two steps back – with the suspect’s fate, toward 
either freedom or incarceration, hanging in the balance.
Applying Santana, the Fifth,65 Eighth,66 Ninth,67 and Tenth68 Circuits have all held 
that Fourth Amendment protections should not be afforded to that which the individual 
exposes to the public through an open door. The protective power of the door has thus 
largely been limited to its closed position. Nonetheless, this limitation has been compli-
cated both by the circumstances that precede the act of crossing the threshold and by the 
intentions of the actors on the two sides of the door. For example, while the courts have 
clarified that when a person stands at the door through her own agency she loses her 
protections, they have complicated the inquiry when a searched person is forced to the 
door or led to the door by ruse. The next section will discuss some of the complicating 
factors of the Open Door’s bright line approach.
IV. Door Configurations: A Jurisprudence of Vision
Circuit courts have varied in their application of the Supreme Court’s threshold and cur-
tilage rules, with the result being far removed from the Supreme Court’s aspiration for a 
bright-line rule. In United States v. Gori,69 for example, the police accompanied a deliv-
ery woman as she knocked on an apartment door, and when one of the occupants opened 
the door wide, the police displayed their badge and ordered everyone present, including 
the defendant, out of the apartment at gunpoint.70 The Second Circuit ruled that this was 
not a violation of Payton because “what a person chooses voluntarily to expose to public 
view thereby loses its Fourth Amendment protection.” The critical facts for the majority 
were that the door was voluntarily opened to an invitee. At that moment, they stated, 
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 71. Gori, 230 F.3d 44 at 50 (quoting another Second Circuit decision).
 72. Gori, 230 F.3d 44 at 58 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
 73. Mark R. Kravitz and Daniel J. Klau, “Developments in the Second Circuit,” Conn. L. Rev. 
34 (2000–2001), 903.
 74. Gori, 230 F.3d at 58–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
 75. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004).
 76. Hadley, 368 F.3d, p. 750.
 77. United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003).
 78. United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003), p. 1224.
 79. United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003), p. 1225.
 80. United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003), p. 1225.
 81. Interestingly, the court did not rely on the fact that Flowers was inside his home at the time 
of arrest to show that there was a Payton violation, although the court does mention in a 
footnote that Flowers was clearly inside the home. See United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 
1222 (10th Cir. 2003), p. 1227, n.3.
what was inside was exposed to public view. “[W]here blinds are raised, police are enti-
tled to peer through back window of home,” the court explained.71
Sonia Sotomayor (while serving on this court) dissented, arguing that per the majority 
opinion, the opening of the door transforms the entire home into a public place. In her 
words: “an open door translates into an ‘open season’ on the individual inside.”72 
Sotomayor vigorously objected to this result,73 noting that “if police cannot seize objects 
in plain view without probable cause when they are already legitimately standing inside 
an individual’s home, it is unclear why the Fourth Amendment would permit them both 
to enter the home from outside and to seize the object or person without probable cause, 
as the majority holds in this case.”74 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner75 also criti-
cized Gori, claiming that since few people would refuse to open the door to the police, 
“the effect of the rule of [Gori] is to undermine, for no good reason that we can see, the 
principle that a warrant is required for entry into the home [excluding specific excep-
tions].”76 Posner opposed Gori for tacitly taking advantage of typical door behavior – 
namely, that most people will automatically respond to a knock by opening their door.
The Tenth Circuit approached matters differently than the majority in Gori. In United 
States v. Flowers,77 the defendant was selling liquor illegally from his home through a 
small panel, revealing only his hand, a portion of his arm, and his voice in the process.78 
After the police conducted business with Flowers, they approached the front door. 
Flowers voluntarily opened it, and the police entered the home and arrested him there. 
The District Court said that Flowers “knowingly exposed too much of himself to the 
public”79 to claim his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that Flowers had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy because he was in a “sufficiently public” place.80 The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Flowers demonstrated “a conscious 
intention” to protect his rights by using the hole in the wall and therefore affirming his 
rights.81 In the words of the court:
In contrast [to Santana and McKinnon], here the suspect was not visible to the public and his 
doorway was not open to public view. Rather only Flowers’ hand and arm were visible and he 
used a hole in the wall so that he would not have to open his door and neither he nor the interior 
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 82. United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003), p. 1228.
 83. For a fuller discussion of the role of vision and seeing in law see Irus Braverman, “Hidden 
in Plain View: Legal Geography from a Visual Perspective,” Journal of Law, Culture and 
the Humanities 7 (2011), 173–86.
 84. See Flowers, 336 F.3d, p. 1227, n.4.
 85. United States v. Arellano-Ochoa, 461 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2006) (operating on the theory 
of privacy from undesired intrusion, not sensory privacy). Compare Frederick C. Moss, 
“Beyond the Fringe: Apocryphal Rules of Evidence in Texas,” Baylor L. Rev. 43 (1991), 
730–31 (attorney argues that screen door between victim and defendant negated self-defense 
argument) with Asten v. City of Boulder, 2009 WL 2766723 (D. Colo. Aug. 26, 2009) (after 
being denied entry, police cut a hole in a screen door to use Taser (stun gun) on occupant).
 86. Arellano, 461 F.3d, p. 1145. See also State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1976) (break-
ing element of burglary met when outer door on spring opened, as inner door was already 
open).
 87. United States v. Sheridan Walker, No. 05-2287 January 31, 2007 (10th Circ.).
of his house would be open to public view. Unlike the situations in Santana and McKinnon, 
Flowers was not as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if he had been 
standing completely outside his house.82
In determining the legal relationship between the larger hole in the wall (the door) and 
the smaller hole in the wall (the panel), the court’s decision again illuminates the impor-
tance of vision to legal practices and pronunciations.83 Whereas the small hole afforded 
no views of the home’s interior and in fact exposed only Flowers’ hand and arm, an open 
door (and, similarly, a window) would have enabled such an interior view of the home, 
thereby triggering the argument that Flowers voluntarily exposed his home to public 
view. “A room with a view” – from the outside in, that is – thus frustrates reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The door in these instances becomes important not only in its 
function as enabling the movement of human bodies in and out, but also in its function 
as a large window that enables the public’s gaze into one’s abode. And in this case: 
because the front door to his home was closed during the liquor exchange, Flowers’ 
rights were deemed worth protecting.84 The material relationship between a hole in the 
wall that is designed for full bodily entry (and that also enables significant viewing) and 
a lesser hole in the wall that performs functions other than entry and vision is thus an 
essential component of the particular legal relationship in this case.
The legal distinction between open and closed doors, and its subsequent triggering of 
full or zero constitutional protections, is further complicated in cases with more than one 
door, especially when these doors are in different states of openness. When a second door 
is opaque and closed, for example, the location of the bright line at the front of the home 
changes, depending on whether the first door is open or closed, again emphasizing the 
role of vision in assigning constitutional protections. In United States v. Arellano-
Ochoa,85 for example, the Ninth Circuit condemned the police’s opening of a screen door 
without a warrant or other justifications, but stated that opening a screen door backed by 
a closed solid door does not violate reasonable expectations of privacy.86 In United States 
v. Sheridan Walker,87 the Tenth Circuit held that after knocking on a screen door, the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy was not violated when the police opened the screen 
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into the Brand at Work,” Iowa L. Rev. 95 (2009), n.180 (discussing an insurance salesperson 
manual suggesting opening outer door while waiting for resident to answer as part of pro-
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 90. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991), p. 1388.
 91. Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1989).
 92. Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1989), p. 1102.
 93. United States v. Herrold, 772 F. Supp. 1483, 1489–90 (M.D. Pa. 1991); United States v. 
George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1414 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989).
 94. See inter alia United States v. Ostin, 858 F.Supp. 1075 (1994), U.S. v. Cruz Jimenez, 894 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
 95. E.g. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991), p. 1388; Duncan v. Storie, 
869 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1989); Robertson v. State, 740 N.E.2d 574, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that defendant is still “in a part of his dwelling” when arrested “two or three steps 
outside of his apartment”).
 96. State v. Santiago, 619 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 1993) (Borden, J. dissenting).
 97. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (open door used as a basis for an extended sweep) but 
see United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 1996) (wanting more than possibility to 
justify sweep when defendant and girlfriend subdued outside of dwelling).
 98. See e.g. Adkisson v. State 728 N.E.2d 175, 178–9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (officer keeps door 
open by placing foot in doorway until he gains consent to enter); United States v. Garcia, 997 
F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant tricked into opening door, officer held door open until 
defendant consented to entry); U.S. v. Salter, 815 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1987) (after defendant 
partially opened the door, officer placed his foot in the doorway and thereby prevented the 
door to knock on the interior door.88 The court based this reasoning on the conclusion 
that most visitors would do the same.89
Finally, the motives and actions of humans on both sides of the door have also fac-
tored into the juridical analysis. The Seventh Circuit clarified, for example, that:
there is a significant difference between a person who for no reason voluntarily decides to stand 
in his open doorway, and a person who merely answers a knock on his door. The person who 
answers the knock and stays within the house is not voluntarily exposing himself ‘to public 
view… as if [he is] standing completely outside [his] house.’90
The Eighth Circuit drew a similar distinction,91 describing the doorway as a public place 
when a suspect is voluntarily standing there, but not when the suspect is compelled – for 
instance, through the police knocking at the door.92 Courts have similarly invalidated 
arrests where the police have attempted to circumvent Payton by summoning a suspect 
to the doorway so that the arrest could occur in a public place.93 Clearly, the bright line 
rule shifts depending on who stands where, when, and why in relation to the door. Some 
courts have held that the legal protections disappear once one opens the door,94 other 
courts found otherwise,95 and some have voiced emotional objections in dissent.96 Fourth 
Amendment rights and protections therefore hinge upon the myriad material properties 
of the door. Open doors,97 partially open doors,98 and being on the wrong side of the 
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door from closing. Although the defendant was induced to unlocking and opening the door 
by officer’s ruse, the officer’s entry is “entry through an open door” and therefore not an 
intrusion); But see United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990), pp. 229–30 (six 
agents knocked on the door of defendant’s hotel room without announcing themselves. The 
defendant opened the door about halfway while standing inside his room. When he saw the 
officers, he attempted to close the door, but several officers with weapons drawn forced their 
way inside and arrested him. The court ruled: “We hold that a person does not surrender his 
expectation of privacy nor consent to the officers’ entry by [opening his door halfway] and 
that his arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the fourth amendment 
and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Payton v. New York.”).
 99. In addition to all of the above contexts, a Payton violation does not require suppression of 
statements made to police if such statements are made after the arrestee is hauled from his 
dwelling. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (1990), pp. 1644–5.
100. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), p. 313.
101. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), p. 313.
102. United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 2005).
103. W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.3(c), 575 (4th 
ed. 2004) (stating that it is a Payton violation to tell a suspect across the threshold that s/he 
is under arrest if the officer does not have a warrant).
104. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997) (abrogated on other grounds in Curley v. 
Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (2007)).
105. E.g. United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274; New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), p. 20.
106. The Washington courts have taken a different approach to door cases, finding the crucial 
fact to be where the arrestee stood upon her arrest. See, e.g., State v. Holman, 693 P.2d 89 
(Wash. 1985), p. 91.
door99 – have all factored into the judicial calculations of a person’s rights vis-à-vis the 
police.
The juridical test, however, has not been strictly material and geographical. In fact, 
some courts have pointed out that an application of an exclusively geographical test would 
lead to undesirable results. Whereas Justice Powell declared that “physical entry into the 
home is the chief evil against which the fourth amendment is directed,”100 he also asserted 
that a physical entry is not necessary because the Amendment’s “broader spirit now 
shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.” He further explains that: “Our 
decision in Katz refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances of actual physical 
trespass.’’ Rather, the Amendment governs “not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements . . . without any ‘technical trespass 
under . . . local property law.’”101 Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell 
relied on the important Katz decision in holding that electronic surveillance necessitates 
the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards. Various courts have also extended the 
physical test when there was “constructive entry” by the police,102 including entry by 
voice,103 telephone call,104 or show of force.105 These decisions explain that denying legal 
protections in such cases would problematically enable the police to comply with Payton 
so long as they do not cross the line of the threshold – namely, walk through the door.106
Alongside the door jurisprudence that has developed around bodily entry, courts have 
also struggled to define the protections afforded to the images observed though the door. 
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United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001).
108. State v. Richards, 962 P.2d 118 (Wash. 1998).
109. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, p. 556 (Black, J., dissenting).
110. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 548.
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U. Pa. L. Rev. 108 (1960), pp. 399–400.
113. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
114. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
115. Wong Sun, 371 U.S., p. 483–4.
116. Wong Sun, 371 U.S., p. 501 (Clark, J., Harlan, J., Stewart, J. and White, J. dissenting).
117. Parra v. City of Chino, 141 F.3d 1178 (Cal. 1998).
118. Parra v. City of Chino, 141 F.3d 1178 (Cal. 1998).
Transparent doors are particularly interesting in this context. On the one hand, such doors 
separate inside from outside in terms of bodily entry, thereby functioning like closed doors; 
on the other hand, they function like open doors in that they enable parties to see both in and 
out. While transparent and open doors allow the police to see into the dwelling, they also 
enable those within the dwelling to observe the police outside the door. For this reason, the 
government has allowed such situations as grounds for exigency claims, namely that the 
occupant may be more likely to destroy or get rid of evidence107 or as a basis for arguments 
mooting the knock and announce requirement.108 Such circumstances could additionally 
serve as proof of consent, as offered in dicta by Justice Black in his dissent in Bumper.109 
There, the relevant issue was whether the suspect’s consent was valid when the police stated 
that they had a warrant although they did not.110 Black noted that the conversation between 
the police officer and the defendant’s grandmother, who consented for the police search of 
the home, took place through a screen door.111 He bolstered the argument for consent by 
pointing out that the defendant’s grandmother was able to see the officer through the door, 
that he did not appear to have a warrant with him, and that she nonetheless allowed him in.
Acts of locking or unlocking one’s door have also factored into Fourth Amendment 
decisions. In certain instances, the police arrested suspects for obstruction when they 
locked a door to prevent police entry, though generally not when they failed to unlock a 
door.112 The courts have, additionally, interpreted various door-slamming actions. In 
Wong Sun113 and in Miller v. United States114 the Court interpreted the suspect’s slam-
ming and subsequent flight from the door down the hallway as signifying “a guilty 
knowledge no more clearly than it did a natural desire to repel an apparently unauthor-
ized intrusion.”115 The dissent finds this interpretation “incredible in the light of the 
record,” stating that “the officer’s showing of his badge and announcement that he was a 
narcotics agent immediately put [the suspect] in flight behind the slamming door. To 
conclude otherwise takes all prizes as a non sequitur.”116 Finally, in Parra v. City of 
Chino,117 the police spoke to Vivian Parra through the screen door, asking to see her 
husband, Manuel.118 She told the police that Manuel would be right out, and then closed 
and apparently locked the screen door before proceeding to fetch him. The police inferred 
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123. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968), p. 591 n. 5.
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126. Sabbath, 391 U.S., p. 591 n. 5 citing Wilgus, “Arrest Without a Warrant,” Mich. L. Rev. 22 
(1924), p. 806.
127. People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299 (Cal. 1968). In the words of C.J. Traynor: “The Attorney 
General contends that since the officers did no more than open an unlocked screen door and 
walk in, no ‘breaking’ within the meaning of the statute occurred. We do not agree with this 
contention. Although the common law rule was first articulated to regulate entry by force, 
it is not limited to entries effected by physical violence . . . At the very least, it covers unan-
nounced entries that would be considered breaking as that term is used in defining common 
law burglary,” at 303.
128. E.g. State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985) (“Entry through an open doorway 
is sufficiently similar [to opening a closed door or using a passkey to] warrant equivalent 
treatment”).
129. U.S. v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Morris, 436 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2006); Jack 
E. Call, “The Constitutionality of Warrantless Door Arrests,” 19 Miss. C. L. Rev. (1999) 333 
(speculating that it could be legal for police to open an unlocked screen door to nab somebody).
from her locking the door and from previous experience with this suspect that Manuel 
presented a flight risk, and barged in.119 The court decided that because the officers knew 
that the suspect had previously fled from police, they had reason to believe that the sus-
pect would resist arrest again. Based on these facts, the court determined that the officers 
satisfied the knock and announce requirement (as detailed below).120
While the Fourth Amendment has been the primary domain for door-related jurispru-
dence, the courts have addressed threshold problems through other legal arenas as well.121 
For example, in Sabbath v. United States,122 the Supreme Court described in a footnote123 
the useful analogy of burglary to the US Code’s knock and announce rule,124 quoting from 
commentators that: “What constitutes ‘breaking’ seems to be the same as in burglary: lift-
ing a latch, turning a door knob, unhooking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to, or push-
ing open, a closed door of entrance to the house, – even a closed screen door . . . is a 
breaking.”125 Here and there, such nuanced features and states of the burglarized door 
were deemed relevant in determining Fourth Amendment issues. Features that have fac-
tored in the analysis include whether a door is locked, latched,126 on a spring,127 wide-
open,128 and whether a screen door exists129 – indeed, almost all possible features of the 
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ment of burglary was satisfied when the defendant opened the door to a business that was 
open to the public and exited through the same door. The appellate court held that: “Neither 
the entry by the defendant nor his exit was against the will of the occupant, but, on the con-
trary, was with its express consent. The door, while actually closed, was constructively open 
to appellant on both occasions,” at 908.
131. Sam Bass Warner, “Crimes Known to the Police – An Index of Crime?,” Harv. L. Rev. 45 
(1931), 307–34. “With regard to variations in burglary reports . . . cities which are truthful 
and accurate in the compilation of their statistics, are suffering by comparison with other 
cities which are building up records that look well in print . . . [I]n some Ohio cities where 
a screen door would be opened by slitting the screen, . . . some departments are not count-
ing that as either a burglary or house-breaking, but record it as a larceny if something was 
stolen and again if a door was partially closed and force was necessary on the part of the 
thief to open the door sufficiently wide to admit his person, . . . some are classifying that as 
a larceny and that a great many of the cities do not make records at all where porch furniture 
and other articles left out in the open, are stolen. However, this is not true in Columbus, for 
we make an absolutely truthful record of every complaint received and while perhaps I have 
no just basis for the conclusion, I believe we might reasonably infer that a good many of the 
police departments are building records apparently disclosing an efficiency which does not 
actually exist and I may further state that whether our record is good or bad, we have at least 
told the truth about ourselves,” at n.26.
132. The knock and announce requirement derives from common law. See Semayne’s Case, 77 
Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). Most states have statutes that require the police to knock and 
announce, typically modeled after 18 U.S.C. Section 3109. Those states with no statutes on 
point have recognized the doctrine through judicial opinion. See also Marc Miller and Ron 
Wright, Criminal Procedures: The Police, 3rd ed. (Aspen Publishers, 2007), p. 203.
133. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the common law 
knock and announce principle is one focus of the reasonableness inquiry and subsequently 
decided that although the standard generally requires the police to announce their intent 
burglarized door have been considered.130 Whereas the state practices discretion in its 
decision whether to record a crime as a burglary or not based on these factors,131 the courts 
are unlikely to hold police officers and burglars to the same standards.
V. The Door’s Spatio-Temporality: Knock, Knock, Knocking 
on Suspect’s Door
Until now, I have mostly focused on the police’s physical crossing of the door’s threshold 
without warrant or exigency. Even when equipped with a warrant, however, the police are 
typically required to perform what is called a knock and announce procedure before enter-
ing the home. Such a procedure requires that the police knock on the door, identify them-
selves as police, and explain their purpose for seeking entry.132 Only after their entry has 
been refused, or after a specified length of time has passed, may the police use force to 
enter.133 The Supreme Court has ruled that the amount of wait required in any given case 
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to search before entering closed premises, “the obligation gives way when officers have 
a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular 
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or . . . would inhibit the effective investigation 
of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence” (Richards v. Wisconsin, 
520 U.S. 385 (1997), p. 394).
134. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
135. Banks was adopted in many Court of Appeal decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Goodson, 
165 F.3d 610, 612, 614 (CA8 1999) (holding a 20-second wait after a loud announcement at 
a one-story ranch reasonable); United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 925–927 (CA6 1998) 
(holding a 15-to-30 second wait in midmorning after a loud announcement reasonable); 
United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 322–323 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding a 15-second wait 
after a reasonably audible announcement at 7:45 a.m. on a weekday reasonable); United 
States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1168 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding a 10-second wait after a loud 
announcement reasonable); United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 361–362 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(relying specifically on the concept of exigency, holding a 15-to-20 second wait reasonable). 
See also United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 981–982, n. 7 (Cal. 2002) (Banks 
appears to be a departure from our prior decisions. . . .[W]e have found a 10 to 20 second 
wait to be reasonable in similar circumstances, albeit when the police heard sounds after the 
knock and announcement); United States v. Jenkins, 175 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding a 14-to-20 second wait at 10 a.m. reasonable); United States v. Markling 7 F.3d 
1309, 1318–1319 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding a 7-second wait at a small motel room reasonable 
when officers acted on a specific tip that the suspect was likely to dispose of the drugs).
136. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003), p. 36.
137. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
depends on the nature of the evidence, the size of the dwelling, the time of day, and other 
factors. Hence, in United States v. Banks (2003), the Court approved a forceful entry by 
officers after they had knocked, announced, and waited for 15 to 20 seconds,134 taking into 
account the risk of drug evidence disposal in evaluating the reasonableness of the waiting 
time.135 Still, the Court reasoned that most people keep their doors locked, and hence 
“entering without knocking will normally do some damage.”136
A few years later, in Hudson v. Michigan (2006) the police arrived to execute a war-
rant, announced their presence, but waited for only three to five seconds before turning 
the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson’s home. Hudson moved to sup-
press the inculpatory evidence they found there, arguing that the premature entry vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment rights.137 “How many seconds’ wait are too few?” asked 
Justice Scalia, concluding that: “Happily, these issues do not confront us here.” Indeed, 
although there was no disagreement that the knock and announce rule was violated in 
this case, the majority held that the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion. He first noted that: “Until a valid warrant 
has issued, citizens are entitled to shield their persons, houses, papers, and effects, from 
the government’s scrutiny. Exclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search 
vindicates that entitlement.” However,
The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different – and do not 
include the shielding of potential evidence from the government’s eyes. One of those interests 
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138. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), p. 594 (citations omitted).
139. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), p. 594.
140. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).
141. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 379 (Powell, J. concurring).
142. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
143. However, they may not invade the vehicle dwellers’ privacy by viewing sex through the car 
windows. See e.g. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980) (consolidated case that struck 
down a New York statute that convicted a man for having sex with his 17-year-old male 
lover in his home; two adults for engaging in oral sex in an automobile parked in downtown 
Buffalo; and a woman for having oral sex with a man in a parked truck, also in Buffalo). See 
also: William N. Eskridge Jr. and Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law: Abridged 
(Foundation Press, 2006), pp. 54–7.
is the protection of human life and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence 
in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident. Another interest is the protection of property. 
Breaking a house (as the old cases typically put it) absent an announcement would penalize 
someone who “did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that 
he would obey it . . .” And thirdly, the knock-and-announce rule protects those elements of 
privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance . . . The brief interlude between 
announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on 
clothes or get out of bed.138
Scalia clarifies, finally, that “What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, 
however, is one’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence 
described in a warrant. Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to 
do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”139
Despite the waning of the knock and announce rule, the police are still required to 
perform the physical, temporal, and legal ritual of knocking, waiting, and announcing 
their presence at the door of a home–all part of the reasonableness requirement. Such a 
multi-sensory procedure that involves rapping, pausing, and using voice reinforces the 
significance of the door as a technology that separates the outside from the inside, effec-
tively construing distinct spatiolegal categories. How will the knock and announce rule 
change when doors are no longer made of wood that can produce the sound of a knock, 
or when human police officers are replaced by dogs or machines? I will return to these 
questions in the conclusion.
VI. Mobile Doors
In South Dakota v. Opperman (1976),140 the Supreme Court elaborated on the privacy 
rights users have in cars. There, the Court held that the car operator has the power to 
exclude others by locking the doors and rolling up the windows (akin to home dwell-
ers).141 One year later, this heightened protection was functionally eviscerated in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977), where the Court determined that the police may order a 
suspect out of her car or demand that she open her door.142 Once the door is open, the 
courts have generally held that the police may look inside.143 The police have often taken 
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144. See inter alia Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (observation of hatchet was used 
as basis to search); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (smelling marijuana only once door 
was opened at police request); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (police officer opens door 
to let suspect out, sees a gun); O’Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United States 
v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
145. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (police observed items matching stolen prop-
erty through car door window while attempting to issue speeding ticket); United States v. 
Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976 (4th Cir. 1997) (bright-line rule that stopping vehicle and opening 
door to visually inspect interior is reasonable when officers are unable to view interior of 
vehicle because of heavily tinted windows).
146. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
147. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), p. 108.
148. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), p. 108.
149. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), p. 108.
150. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), p. 119.
151. Oddly, the court notes that the officer could have ordered the suspect to move the papers, 
which would have been less intrusive, but does not address this alternative further.
152. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
153. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), pp. 147–8.
154. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), pp. 147–8.
155. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
advantage of this opportunity for obtaining evidence to search or arrest suspects.144 
Moreover, unlike the home, the car is not encircled by a protective curtilage zone and, 
hence, the police may stand just outside the car and peer into its interior through the 
windows, negating any minimal protections that the door may have afforded to this rela-
tively small space.145
Three Supreme Court cases discussed police invasion into the protected space of 
the car through its door – and in all three cases the Court found that they acted prop-
erly. In the first case, New York v. Class,146 the defendant was stopped for speeding. 
The officer opened the car door to find the VIN number, which he believed was 
located in the doorjamb of this particular model of car.147 When he did not find it, the 
officer proceeded to look in the next most likely spot, which was obscured by a few 
papers.148 When moving the papers, the officer found a gun.149 The Court decided 
that the defendant’s rights were not violated both because there was no privacy inter-
est in the VIN number and because the search was “sufficiently unintrusive.”150 In 
the words of the Court: “He did not even intrude into the interior at all until after he 
had checked the doorjamb for the VIN. When he did intrude, the officer simply 
reached directly for the unprotected space where the VIN was located to move the 
offending papers.”151
The second Supreme Court case, Adams v. Williams152 raised a similar dilemma. 
There, the officer requested that the defendant open his car door based on a reliable 
informant’s tip that the defendant had narcotics and a gun tucked in his waistband.153 
Instead of opening the door, the defendant rolled down the window, and the officer 
reached in and grabbed the otherwise non-visible handgun.154 The Court applied Terry,155 
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156. Class, 475 U.S. at 147–8.
157. Adams, at 147–8 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30).
158. Massachusetts v. Podgurski, 459 U.S. 1222 (Rehnquist J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
159. Massachusetts v. Podgurski, 459 U.S. 1222 (Rehnquist J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari), p. 1223.
160. Massachusetts v. Podgurski, 459 U.S. 1222 (Rehnquist J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari), p. 1225.
161. Not only may you not exclude the police, but the door may be the mechanism the police 
have to restrict your ability to move. In Mimms, supra, the court mentions in a footnote a 
police vehicle stops manual which suggests that officers push car doors closed if the person 
inside attempts to exit the vehicle.
162. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), p. 694 (“reasonable suspicion became prob-
able cause when Deputy Luedke found the loose panel”).
163. Robert Frost, “The Lockless Door,” in A Miscellany of American Poetry (Harcourt, Brace 
and Howe, 1920).
finding the officer’s behavior reasonable.156 In this case, the defendant’s not opening the 
vehicle door was part of the officer’s justification to conduct the search. The Court stated:
Sgt. Connolly had ample reason to fear for his safety. When Williams rolled down his window, 
rather than complying with the policeman’s request to step out of the car so that his movements 
could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at Williams’ waist became an even greater 
threat. Under these circumstances the policeman’s action in reaching to the spot where the gun 
was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we 
conclude that it was reasonable. The loaded gun seized as a result of this intrusion was therefore 
admissible at Williams’ trial.157
Finally, in Massachusetts v. Podgurski the Supreme Court dealt with a slightly different 
type of threshold problem.158 In that case, the officer stuck his head through a van door that 
was partially open, and observed contraband.159 Rehnquist felt that this intrusion was mini-
mal because it was the functional equivalent of standing just outside of the threshold.160
The end result of these three cases appears to be that the car door is not a very effec-
tive spatiolegal technology for excluding the police.161 Quite the contrary, the very exist-
ence of the door – and the perceived risk and danger of what lies beyond it – has at times 
provided the police with the required justification for carrying out searches and seizures. 
In Ornelas v. United States, for example, an officer observed a loose panel in the door, 
using this observation, among others, to constitute probable cause for a search.162
VII. Conclusion: The Door as a Matter of Freedom
I blew out the light, 
I tip-toed the floor, 
And raised both hands,
In prayer to the door.
—Robert Frost, “The Lockless Door”163
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164. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2045, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (quoting 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)).
165. Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2001).
166. Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2001).
167. Gori, 230 F.3d, p. 54.
168. Gori, 230 F.3d, p. 54 (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 
684 (1969)).
169. Gori, 230 F.3d, p. 54.
170. State v. Santiago, 619 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 1993) (Borden, J., dissenting).
171. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
172. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
173. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
174. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___ (2013).
To prevent incursions to the home “by even a fraction of an inch,”164 U.S. courts have 
attempted a concrete and concise delineation of the home’s threshold. Simultaneously, 
the courts have declared that “we need not pull out our rulers”165 for “splitting fractions 
of an inch can be a very treacherous endeavor, producing arbitrary results.”166 The details 
of where exactly one stands in relation to the door may be better left “descriptive,”167 the 
courts have said, since such “metaphysical subtleties”168 are ineffective and dangerous 
ways to discuss Fourth Amendment concerns.169 In the words of Judge Borden: “By 
opening the door . . . and standing there briefly so that our feet are on the threshold rather 
than just inside it, we do not abandon our heightened expectation of privacy in our homes 
and place ourselves in a public place.”170
The door is not only a technological miracle, as Latour has observed, but also a legal 
one. Once the threshold is crossed, a transformation occurs. Tracing the material and 
symbolic importance of the door for establishing Fourth Amendment protections, this 
article has attempted to illuminate the importance of matter – both physical and symbolic 
– in juridical discourse. In particular, I have highlighted how various door conditions 
affect the level of protection granted to those situated inside the door and the importance 
of vision for establishing legally accepted expectations of privacy. Finally, I have shown 
that the courts have interpreted doors differently in the context of cars. A comparison of 
car to house doors has highlighted that beyond their shared liminality across spaces, the 
sacredness of the home in American jurisprudence is what grants certain doors but not 
others heightened legal protections.
I have also pointed out that we may be witnessing the twilight of the physical door era 
– at least as we currently know it – and the beginning of a new, virtual door era in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, advanced technologies – such as highly trained 
police dogs, Global Positioning Systems, and infrared thermal devices – are already 
alerting to, and thereby bringing to view, both things and information that previously 
resided behind firmly closed doors. As is becoming apparent from a growing number of 
Fourth Amendment cases – including Karo,171 Kyllo,172 Jones,173 and Jardines174 – the 
Supreme Court has been attempting to preserve the familiar physical invasion test of 
the physical door era. At the same time, the Court has also been responding to the 
692 Law, Culture and the Humanities 12(3)
contemporary realities of “seeing through walls” and “cyber doors,” which increasingly 
call into question the continued legal primacy of physical doors. As the alterations of 
physical and technological matter present increasingly sophisticated challenges to the 
distinctions between inside and outside, private and public, and prohibited and accepted 
visions, the Supreme Court will need to carefully articulate what it deems is worth pro-
tecting on the other side of the door.
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